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This paper seeks to critically examine recent debates on global governance, albeit from a human 
development perspective. In doing so it identifies and describes two important principles for 
building institutions for the advancing of human development: what may be termed the 
imperative of democratic accountability (most closely associated with the work of Amartya 
Sen) and the imperative of institutional experimentation (which has been theorized most 
extensively by Roberto Unger). The paper discusses these two principles in light of some of the 
major challenges that can and do affect the international community as a whole. It reviews some 
of the decentralized forms of governance which are evolving as developing countries assert 
themselves in debates on institutional organization. It then focuses more extensively on the 
global financial crisis as a case study in the inadequacies of current global governance. Finally, it 
uses the two imperatives mentioned to review the lessons that the crisis has provided, before 
describing specific proposals to redesign systems of global economic governance. Chief among 
these are the reforms advocated by the Commission of Experts of the President of the United 
Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System.  
 
 
Keywords: Human Development, Economic Development, Inequality, Human Rights, 
Capabilities, Health, Governance 
 
 












The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports.   1 
1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of the last two years has been truly global in terms of its origins and 
its impacts. Sharp reversals in trade and financial flows have affected virtually every 
country in the world and resulted in an unprecedented set of policy actions to stem the 
crisis and to restore growth and development. What has been remarkable about policy 
making in the aftermath is the extent to which the response has been nationally based as 
opposed to internationally arranged.  Although there were calls for global coordination 
from the onset, for the most part immediate policy responses were undertaken on an ad-
hoc basis by national authorities. Efforts to help those countries least able to undertake 
remedial action were also discussed, but despite some proposals these responses have 
been weak and non-committal. From the perspective of the poorest developing nations, 
this crisis is not simply a collapse in the economic order, but also reflects a continuing 
failure of  global governance.  Scholars and policy makers  have  also  made pointed 
arguments  that  international institutions  were important contributors  to the crisis by 
providing  excessively narrow policy advice. In addition, they did not diagnose the 
weaknesses of the global economy and failed  to participate  in  the  initial attempts at 
resolution of the crisis
1
The financial crisis is only one of many pressing issues  that face  the international 
community. The growth of global inequality, the energy and food crises, climate change, 
global pandemics and other  such  challenges  are equally urgent problems which can 
severely limit human flourishing in the years to come. Rapid global integration thus far 
has meant  that  several  gaps have  developed between the scale and complexity of 
transnational problems and the ability of existing national institutions to deal adequately 
with these. In the face of these widespread economic, environmental and technological 
. Not only did the governance of the world economy fail to shelter 
vulnerable populations after the crisis, it actively eroded their economic security  by 
promoting policies which prevented national authorities from adequately protecting their 
citizens and maintaining economic security for their poorest.    
                                                 
1  See for example, Chapter 4 of The  Report of the Commission of Experts of the 
President of the United Nations General Assembly  on Reforms of the International 
Monetary and Financial System (henceforth Commission of Experts 2009).    2 
upheavals, the nation-state has lost some its viability as the primary location to deal with 
these changes. As David Held (2006) has put it: “..[T]he paradox of our times refers to 
the fact that the collective issues we must grapple with are of growing cross-border 
extensity and intensity, but the means for addressing these are state-based, weak and 
incomplete.”  
This fact in turn has  resulted in  a continuous public discussion of the appropriate 
institutional structures for dealing with global integration and of the dilemmas and issues 
associated with existing multilateral institutions  such as the United Nations, the 
International Financial Institutions and the World Trade Organization. Such concerns 
have only become more heightened as a consequence of the global financial crisis. 
There are at least two reasons why these debates continue to be highly charged. Firstly, 
they reflect the fact that there is legitimacy both in the idea of universal rights of human 
beings as well as in the idea that particular groups should be able to determine their own 
future and control their own fates. There is an inevitable tension which exists between the 
desire to formally extend universal ideals such as those enshrined in the Declaration of 
Human  Rights and the  recognition  that  devolution and decentralization can enhance 
accountability to the people and enabling direct participation in decision-making. The 
cosmopolitan ideal of expanding rights and capabilities across the globe is sometimes 
limited by the ideals of self-determination and maintaining sovereignty. Secondly, the 
debates  are  charged  because  current global institutions  and  multilateral governance 
structures  continue to have open reliance on the  Westphalian order  and derive their 
legitimacy from the assumption that nation-states act and make decisions on an imagined 
level  (or near level) playing field.  Yet, the governance of extant institutions self-
evidently reflects the vastly unequal power and influence of nation-states in deciding 
global outcomes.  
The major bodies of global governance were created at the end of the last great crisis 
during which economic and political power were held to a much larger extent by 
countries of the Global North. These countries maintain disproportionate control over the 
institutions, and this arrangement fails to reflect current world realities in which several   3 
developing countries account for a larger proportion of global economic output  and 
population and whose decisions have greater consequence for global governance. As just 
one example of this institutional inertia, Belgium still holds more quotas than Brazil 
(2.12% vs. 1.41%) at the International  Monetary  Fund.  Similarly, the permanent 
membership of the UN Security Council has remained unchanged for over six decades. 
In the last decade or so, there have been significant changes occurring in the global 
political economy which necessitate a re-evaluation and re-conceptualization of existing 
systems of governance.  These include the greater share in economic output of China and 
India and the political influence of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), 
the increased importance of these and other developing countries as sources of global 
liquidity, the increasing reliance on economic governance through regional blocs and 
other coalitions, the new coherence of intermediate groupings like the G-20 and the G-77, 
the entry of philanthropic organizations into policy making and so on. These new 
practices act as challenges to the existing models of global governance and will need to 
be evaluated  and  modified  so that they enhance human development in the coming 
decades. 
This paper accordingly seeks to critically examine recent debates on global governance, 
albeit from a human development perspective. In doing so, it explores the ways in which 
the disparate challenges of economic crises, political disempowerment, global health and 
sustainability  are being currently  addressed at  the regional and global levels and 
examines proposals to more effectively deal with these. The global financial crisis has 
provided new urgency to these issues and as such the major focus of the paper is to 
review the inadequacies of global monetary and economic arrangements and a few of the 
numerous  new policy prescriptions  to remedy them. The paper is divided into three 
further  sections as follows. The first section examines the critical importance of 
organizing effective global institutions for the purpose of human development and briefly 
discusses some major challenges that can and do affect the international community. It 
summarizes the theoretical underpinnings for the primacy of institutions as derived from 
two strands of development theory and the extent towards which these ideas have been 
acted upon in developing frameworks of global governance.  In doing so it identifies and   4 
describes two important principles for building institutions for the advancing of human 
development: what may be termed the imperative of democratic accountability (most 
closely associated with the work of Amartya Sen (Sen 1999)) and the imperative of 
institutional experimentation (which has been theorized most extensively by Roberto 
Unger (Unger 1987). These are to ensure that global governance adequately promotes 
human development. The section then goes on to discuss these two principles in light of 
some of the major challenges that can and do affect the international community as a 
whole. Finally, it reviews some of the decentralized forms of governance which are being 
developed as developing countries assert themselves in debates on institutional 
organization. The second section focuses more extensively on the global financial crisis 
as a case study in the inadequacies of current global governance. It  uses the two 
imperatives mentioned to review  the lessons that the crisis has provided, before 
describing specific proposals to redesign systems of global economic governance. Chief 
among these are the reforms advocated by the Commission of Experts of the President of 
the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and 
Financial System
 2
2: Institutions, Development and Global Governance. 
. The final section concludes. 
2.1 New Institutionalism, New Growth Theory and Developmentalist Paradigms of 
Institutions 
In the recent past, scholars of development have rediscovered and re-emphasized the 
critical role of institutions in producing positive development outcomes. Two different 
strands of thinking on this issue can be identified in this regard.  
New Institutional  and New Growth  economics  suggests that economic and social 
outcomes are largely determined by the ‘rules of the game’ of development. As 
Williamson (2000) notes, these rules can be seen as embedded at many levels in societies. 
                                                 
2  The author was involved in the deliberations of the committee and hence the 
recommendations of this committee will be the major point of focus. Additionally, these 
recommendations are possibly most pertinent to the issues of UN reform which is of 
major current interest.   5 
Thus for example, institutions can refer to shared normative expectations (such as 
enabling trust between people). Shared patterns of understanding are critically important 
in explaining cross sectional differences in development  (Knack and Keefer 1997). 
Institutions are also often taken to mean the formal legal arrangements and property 
rights frameworks that exist in different societies. These different arrangements, it is 
argued, are “fundamental determinants of long run growth” (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2005)). The quality of these institutions is argued to be more important to 
growth than other determinants such as natural endowments or openness to trade and 
finance. Inasmuch as human development is intimately intertwined with the process of 
economic growth, the quality of institutions also therefore determine human capability 
and flourishing.  As in the title of an influential paper on this topic:  “Institutions Rule” 
(Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004).  
While these studies take the institutional environment as a given ‘endowment’, another 
set of theories, most closely associated with theorists of the development state (Amsden, 
1989, Chang 2002,  Evans 1995)  present evidence (primarily from East Asia)  of the 
crucial role of activist state institutions in producing developmental success. According to 
this viewpoint, institutions do indeed matter, but it is the robust public institutions which 
buttress the developmental state that are important in promoting improvements in the 
welfare of their populations. A primary example of these effective public institutions is 
the public provisioning of collective goods such as education or healthcare which were 
critical to the expansion in capabilities experienced by those societies
3
These  development  successes were achieved  at the level of the nation in an era of 
relatively  limited globalization. Global integration  and the recognition of increasing 
interdependency provide a different challenge for the design of institutions to achieve 
similar ends.  Effective global governance is necessitated  by the fact that there exist 
. Indeed, a central 
function of developmental  states  is to  provide means whereby the poorest and most 
vulnerable can enhance and invest in their own capabilities. 
                                                 
3 The institutional framework which allowed for this redistributive policy of state actors 
in East Asia and which prevented rent-seeking and capture is best described as one of 
‘embedded autonomy’ in Peter Evans’s now classic work (Evans 1995).   6 
numerous problems that go beyond the capacity of individual states to solve efficiently. 
Such challenges include the arranging of a set of effective and equitable trading and 
investment rules, the handling of international threats such as global warming or 
pandemics, the importance  of international migration and the like. Neither  the New 
Institutionalist nor the Developmental State perspectives provide unambiguous answers 
as to how to create and promote feasible arrangements which might best serve to advance 
human development in the face of these concerns.   
The New Institutionalist framework underscores the primacy of embedded legal and 
normative conventions but has little to say about the ways in which these rules are or can 
be generated. This of course applies with greater force to the problem of establishing 
conventions globally. Even if policy makers were able to obtain and enforce a given set 
of rules that were correlated with past development success, globally imposing a  strict 
set of legal and normative rules that mimic those in developed societies may serve to 
limit the room for institutional experimentation that has been central to the development 
success of several countries
4
From a developmentalist perspective, the challenge of global institution building consists 
of either envisioning a global economic order which allows for developmental states to 
flourish, or of trying to scale the success of the developmental state to a global level. If 
the focus is on the former, the challenge is to establish a flexible enough set of rules that 
. Equally importantly, in the absence of reasonably equal 
decision making power between nation-states, these rules will disproportionately reflect 
the interests of the more powerful.  
                                                 
4  Martin Ravallion (2008) notes that the most compelling recent case of rapid 
development—that of China--has been marked by a pragmatic experimentation with 
different policies. “In 1978, the Communist Party’s 11th Congress broke with its 
ideology-based approach to policy making, in favor of a more pragmatic approach, which 
Deng Xiaoping famously dubbed the process of “feeling our way across the river.” At its 
core was the idea that public action should be based on evaluations of experiences with 
different policies: this is essentially what was described at the time as “the intellectual 
approach of seeking truth from facts.” In looking for facts, a high weight was put on 
demonstrable success in actual policy experiments on the ground..... The rural reforms 
that were then  implemented nationally helped achieve probably the most dramatic 
reduction in the extent of poverty the world has yet seen. (Ravallion 2008) 
   7 
provides enough agency to nation-states while realizing the need for some degree of 
homogenization to facilitate global integration. If the  focus is on the  latter, the 
requirement is  to design a global developmental matrix that provides a set of rights that 
allow individuals globally to enhance their own capabilities, just as the development state 
at the nation-state level invested in programs such as health care, education and other 
socially beneficial (but individually costly) programs. Unlike with the institutions of the 
nation-state, however, the legitimacy and redistributive capacity of global institutions are 
far more limited. In a world system consisting of sovereign states, with no legitimate 
body acting to maintain accountability and elicit compliance, governance is limited to 
coordinated arrangements that better ‘share’  or limit sovereignty in specific areas. 
These  limitations of both the New Institutionalist and Developmentalist perspectives 
notwithstanding, both strands of thinking have been central to the construction of global 
governance over the last two decades. Thus, there has been an effort to ‘get  global 
institutions right’ by creating a set of broadly agreed upon, multilaterally enforceable 
rules  and principles of integration  such as those envisioned in the World Trade 
Organization.  The International Financial Institutions have  also in the past  provided 
policy advice which tended to homogenize economic policy according to a set of 
principles rather than promote greater space for experimentation. At the same time, there 
have been efforts to enhance universally agreed upon desiderata for human development 
such as those enshrined in the Millennium Development Goals. Indeed, the MDGs openly 
reflect a capability-enhancing approach and the explicit adoption of policies associated 
typically with developmental and welfare states (universal education, expanding health 
services and reducing disease burdens, for example). This agenda has involved a more 
interventionist approach and is less reliant on given rules. 
2.2  Uneven Adoption of Paradigms into Practice 
At the current stage, the former project has perhaps been more far reaching than the 
latter- most prominently in the successful creation of institutions dealing with globally 
enforceable market and property right rules and the continued push towards a greater 
liberal order by international institutions. The widespread adoption of the World Trade   8 
Organization in 1995 increased the legitimacy associated with accepting global market 
rules. In turn the rules set by the WTO and  in other bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements  have  imposed  distinct limits on policy experimentation and the extent of 
distinctive national markets in developing countries and promoted a particular pattern of 
development (Wade 2003, Ruggie 1994, Evans 2009). Finally, the IFIs have also limited 
policy space as part of their conditionalities following financial  assistance
5.  Such an 
impinging upon domestic policy is unprecedented since the colonial era and has enabled 
some forms of global integration by promoting a legally transparent environment in 
which  capital and goods flows can take place. However,  the consequences of this 
homogenization for human development are far from clear. At the very least, the stalling 
on the Doha Round (the so-called development round) in the WTO is indicative of the 
perceived difficulties for development from adopting uniform market rules.
6
By contrast to the concerted drive towards universal market rules and uniform policy 
environments, the adoption of the Global Developmentalist agenda has been far more 
fitful.  Unlike with the nation state, redistribution and the expansion of capabilities on a 
global scale is reliant on moral suasion rather than enforcement of policy. Despite the 
   Equally, 
they point towards a perceived illegitimacy in the current order in which a genuine parity 
in power and influence among states is missing. Where developing countries have veto 
power, as in the WTO, they have appeared to register their protest effectively. In other 
fora they have either been unable or unwilling to do so. 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that the IMF has appeared in the recent past to suggest that such 
limitations on policy space have been reduced. See IMF (2009) available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/091009A.pdf 
 
6 Partly as a consequence of these difficulties, there has been more progress on bilateral 
trade agreements which again seek to promote a set of universal market rules. After the 
failure of the Cancun round, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick explicitly noted 
that the United States would pursue bilateral free trade agreements with ‘can do’ states to 
prevent being stalled by a group of 'won't do' countries. These bilateral trade agreements 
often include provisions which require greater integration and fewer policies whereby 
domestic policy makers can discriminate between domestic and non-domestic agents. 
These and other issues are discussed at greater length in UNCTAD's Trade and 
Development Report 2007.  
   9 
commitment to a minimal set of goals, developed countries have fallen short in providing 
the resources for such efforts to succeed in achieving these. The millennium development 
gap report suggests the extent  of these shortfalls.  The promise to increase overseas 
development assistance in 2005 to $50 billion a year has not materialized. Similarly, 
commitments to increase ODA to less developed countries and to Africa have not been 
met (MDG gap report 2009). The fundamental ability of the developmental state to divert 
resources to promote capability enhancing services for its citizens has not yet been scaled 
to the global level.  The lack of a matrix of activist developmentalist institutions at the 
global level has meant that apart from the achievement of the MDGs, there are several 
equally pressing issues  (climate change, the food crisis, the energy crisis) which continue 
to remain ineffectively or unevenly addressed. 
2.3  Democratic Accountability and Institutional Experimentation 
The above discussion suggests that from a human development perspective, there are two 
distinct challenges afforded in the consideration of global governance, what may be 
termed the imperative of democratic accountability and the imperative of 
institutional experimentation. The first  derives from the idea, most extensively 
presented by Amartya Sen (Sen 1999) that there is a conjointness in the expansion of 
capabilities and the process of public deliberation about development policy. In his words 
“..a proper  understanding of what economic needs are—their content and their force—
requires discussion and exchange” (Sen 1999, pp 153). Democracy in that sense is key to 
defining specific developmental goals. This in turn suggests that for considerations of 
global governance, there must be reform of existing global arrangements to better serve 
the needs of representativeness and accountability
7
                                                 
7 Of course, this is simply a necessary and not sufficient condition -the degree to which 
enhancing developing country participation in global governance enhances human 
development is dependent also on developing country’s responsiveness to their citizenry. 
Procedural accountability is not the same as substantive accountability. 
. If the institutions of global 
governance only serve to reflect the gross disparities in power and influence between 
states,  they will continue to deal inadequately with the challenges of poverty and 
sustainability, especially as these are faced most extensively by poorer countries.   10 
Roughly speaking, this program requires increasing voice and participation of more 
vulnerable and marginalized states in setting the global rules and in deliberation about 
those rules and their effect on capabilities. A capability perspective applies in some sense 
to the level of the deliberations of nation-states. Thus good global governance is not, 
from such a viewpoint, simply an effective agreement on a set of rules, but rather an 
enabling environment that can allow nations to develop their own ideas of progress and 
the expansion of human functioning.  
The second (related but distinct) idea has been most extensively theorized by Roberto 
Unger (Unger 1987, 1999, 2002, 2007) who suggests that development is best served by 
the practice of democratic experimentalism which consists of extensive tinkering and 
adaptation of institutional arrangements of the government and the economy. Indeed, the 
developmental state often  managed to achieve their successes precisely by such 
experimentation as evidenced by the wide variety of measures these have taken (Evans, 
1995). The challenge for global governance is to ask how the successes of the 
developmental state  can be scaled up to the international level
8
It is worthwhile to briefly review a couple of the specific arenas where these imperatives 
have played and will play themselves out: the governance of climate change and of global 
public health. Both of these constitute examples of global public goods described by 
Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern (1999) as  “goods whose benefits extend to all countries, 
people, and generations”. The strongest cases for global collective action are provided by 
the absence of desirable global public goods and the presence of global threats. Other 
examples of the provision of such goods include maintaining peace and security, ensuring 
. Thus, just as the 
developmental state finds effective and novel mechanisms  and institutional forms  to 
redirect resources effectively towards the goals of  poverty alleviation and capability 
enhancement, global institutions should be able to achieve the same at an international 
level. The challenge is made greater by the need to appropriately cede sovereignty in 
some areas in which such secession is often  very unpopular,  and to imagine new 
possibilities. 
                                                 
8 An alternative perspective is to suggest that global governance should serve to limit the 
globally imposed constraints on local or national innovation.   11 
food security, and establishing global financial stability. Like with national public goods, 
global public goods are likely to be undersupplied by private or decentralized actors. 
Without  global coordination and enforcement, standard problems noted by economic 
theory—free riding, overuse of commons and the like—will abound. From an economic 
perspective, the only way to handle these failures of coordination is to ‘internalize the 
externality’ so that private or decentralized agents take into account the full social costs 
and benefits of their actions. Kaul et al (2003) propose a political analogue to this 
position in what they term the equivalence principle, viz.: the span of a goods benefits or 
costs should be matched with the span of the jurisdiction in which decisions are taken 
about the production of the good. In the absence of institutions which appropriately and 
legitimately assign these jurisdictions, governance will remain sub-optimal. 
Perhaps the most widely agreed upon  global public good  is a stable and sustainable 
climate. The debate on the management of climate change is a critical testing ground for 
the efficacy of global governance. The Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2001  (IPCC 2001)  made clear the 
enormously dire implications for human development arising from climate change.  
These include  a wide range of poverty-related channels, such as a sharp reduction in crop 
yields,  a loss of agricultural productivity of over 30%,  a loss of food security and 
employment, enormous displacement of the poor from coastal regions, an increased 
exposure to new health risks  from vector-borne and water-borne diseases, sharply higher 
malnutrition and the like. Poorer developing countries face the highest risk since they are 
the most reliant on agriculture and far less able to insure their poor against rapid changes 
in livelihoods. Since the report these warnings have only gotten more severe. Despite 
these warnings, the recent UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen has widely been 
considered to have been a failure with very little actionable agreements made by nations. 
Some of this failure is due to  a lack of democratic accountability  and deliberation. 
Uneven representation in global fora is a very important reason for lack of significant 
progress in reducing carbon emissions. Apart from lacking parity in formal 
representation, developing countries also often lack capacity and negotiating strength   12 
which limits their ability to participate fully in climate change deliberations
9. Equally, 
developing countries have been suspicious of the working of the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF)–the main arm of financing for the environment-because of its placement 
in the World Bank and the uneven voting
10
Another important area for human development in which public goods abound is the 
arena of global public health.  Increased health is in many ways the sine qua non of 
development, and public health interventions are crucial to achieve development ends. 
The World Health Organization (2002) notes at least three goods which have a global 
reach and hence can qualify as global public goods: research and development into 
disease, preventing the cross-border spread of communicable disease and standardizing 
data collection efforts. The most contentious of these three has been the first, primarily 
because of the manner in which pharmaceutical research and development has been 
incentivized thus far through the patent system and in which the property rights 
 representation that it thereby entails. There 
has also been a lack of progress because of the lack of innovation and coherence of extant 
institutions. The UN system has arguably been riven by divisions between the developed 
and developing countries and therefore not coordinated (see Held and Hervey, 2009). 
Several innovations in institutional design, including expanding the mandate of the GEF, 
scaling up the status of the United Nations Environmental Program and establishing an 
institution to monitor compliance and enforce agreements have been put forward, but not 
yet acted upon. Addressing the challenges of global warming and climate change will 
require addressing both imperatives of democratic accountability and  institutional 
experimentation. 
                                                 
9 See Chasek & Rajamani, 2003 and Mason, 2008 for more on the importance of the 
accountability deficit on the lack of progress in climate change legislation) 
10  International Institutions have a myriad of voting rules, ranging from effective veto 
power  for a few in the case of the UN security council for example, to uneven 
representation as in the Bretton Woods Twins, to pure majority rules as in the WTO. An 
analysis of different voting rules and their effectiveness is a vast and complex topic and 
the focus of detailed study in welfare economics beginning with Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem, (Arrow, 1950 and continuing to date. A reasonable précis of this body of work 
is beyond the purview of this paper. One may note however, the work of Eric Maskin 
(Maskin 2001, Dasgupta and Maskin 2008) who shows that the majority rule is weakly 
preferred to all other rules for a wide range of cases.   13 
associated with patents have been globalized through the World Trade Organization and 
the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement.  There are two major 
issues in the governance of global health. First, there is the problem of inadequate 
development of viable medicine for neglected diseases
11
The TRIPS agreement and consequent bilateral trade agreements have only served to 
worsen these problems and limit the ability of governments to promote public health. The 
TRIPS agreement limited the potential for generic companies to reverse engineer 
medicines invented after 1995, especially in countries such as India and Brazil which 
have large and vibrant generic pharmaceutical sectors. These  policies  will serve to 
seriously limit the accessibility of medicines for the poorest in the years to come (see 
Park and Jayadev 2009 for an in-depth study of the case of India). While the TRIPS 
agreement provides some flexibility to developing countries which face public health 
emergencies to issue compulsory licenses and thereby elide patent protection, these are 
hard to use because of the political consequences and disapproval from the countries of 
the north whose patents are infringed. A recent example is provided by the compulsory 
license issued by Thailand for Efavirenz, Kaletra and Plavix, drugs to treat HIV and 
cardiovascular disease. While perfectly within the legal framework of the WTO, this 
resulted in the US Trade Representative elevating Thailand to its list of worst intellectual 
property offenders in its 2007 Special 301 Report, with potential consequences for its 
trade with the US. Bilateral trade agreements that followed the TRIPS agreement add 
what are sometimes called TRIPS plus provisions which further rigidify the IP regimes in 
developing countries. These include private enforcement (whereby private firms can sue 
governments) and data exclusivity (an extra layer of patent protection, ostensibly to 
. These diseases and others affect 
one sixth of the world’s population and seriously restrict human flourishing. A second 
and related issue is that of access to medicine for low- income countries. The WHO has 
estimated that about 10 million die every year because they do not have access to existing 
medicines and vaccines either because these are too expensive or are not made available 
for other reasons. 
                                                 
11 These include sleeping sickness, lymphatic filariasis, blinding trachoma, leishmeniasis, 
malaria and others   14 
compensate pharmaceutical companies for undertaking clinical trials) (Park and Jayadev, 
2009). As some have argued, the adoption of these latter agreements has been made with 
very unequal partners (Oxfam 2006) and tends to reflect the interests of the developed 
country partner.   
Research and development into pharmaceutical research has been, on the other hand, the 
focus of very interesting new forms of institutional innovation  and experimentation 
which hold great promise as new governance models to improve global health outcomes. 
Thus for example, private-public partnerships such as the International Aids Vaccine 
Initiative and philanthropic organizations such as the Gates Foundation have invested 
significantly into preventing and curing neglected diseases. At the same time, there have 
been many new suggestions for promoting Research and Development without providing 
monopoly rights. Thus, there has been increased interest in what has been termed the 
prize fund (Stiglitz 2006) in which the inventor of a desirable medicine is paid a lump 
sum from a fund so that the drug itself can be produced at marginal cost and be made 
freely available. A variation of this is the Health Impact Fund associated with Thomas 
Pogge and Aidan Hollis (Hollis and Pogge 2008) which seeks to reward inventors by 
paying for an increase in disability adjusted life years. While it is too early to tell the 
impact of these initiatives on actual development outcomes, they provide examples of 
genuinely new forms of governance which solve some of the seemingly intractable 
problems in improving global health outcomes.  
2.4  Heterogeneity of the Global South 
While  a lack  of democratic accountability and limited  institutional experimentation 
constitute important shortcomings in global governance, not all developing countries are 
equally affected by these problems. Soret (2009) provides a useful distinction among 
developing countries in their engagement with global governance. 
“Depending on their economic power and on their strategic interests these countries may 
be grouped into at least three different categories: large emerging economies that claim 
to be part of the major economic powers grouping; emerging economies that wish to play   15 
a role in global governance and to continue taking advantage of the economic 
integration; and other developing countries, including the least developed countries that 
are not part of the G20 and support a stronger role for the UN. The plurality of the 
South, especially the assertiveness of numerous emerging countries, brings to light a 
complex and changing global order”  (Soret 2009) 
Chief among the large emerging economies are Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
collectively known as the BRIC countries. These constitute about 40% of the world’s 
population, and all constitute major nodes of economic growth. All are part of the G-20 
and therefore are atypical among developing countries in terms of their inclusion in 
global decision making  and their ability to challenge existing systems of global 
governance. This grouping has begun to act in explicit alliance following the first BRIC 
summit in Yekaterinaburg in 2009. However, even prior to this, they have been at the 
center of critical decisions in the world economy. Thus, for example, Brazil, China and 
India have been key players in the resistance to the Doha round of the WTO and sought 
to protect their (relatively) large agricultural sectors. Similarly, they (particularly Brazil) 
have been at the forefront of challenging WTO rules as being rigged and promoting 
double standards. These countries have further been strengthened vis-à-vis the developed 
world because of their huge foreign reserves and need for liquidity by the IMF. At the 
moment therefore, these countries have also been leading the push for greater 
representation in the IFIs. Equally, they have pushed for other major changes in the 
global financial architecture (including the use of an alternate reserve currency). This last 
point will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.   
Countries in other groupings such as the G-77 (which includes 134 developing countries) 
and G-24 have traditionally had much less capacity for challenging the status quo. In the 
wake of the financial crisis however, these countries have begun to assert themselves and 
worked together more effectively as a coalition (this is true in particular of the G-77). 
Thus, the group has challenged the legitimacy of the G-20 as the appropriate forum for 
global governance. In addition, it has demanded additional sources of funding to tide over 
the current crisis. The new-found coherence was also evident in the Copenhagen summit,   16 
where the grouping acted as the most potent resistance to the proposed climate 
agreement.   
One might add a fourth grouping to Soret’s categorization: developing countries which 
form regional blocs to contest and influence global  and regional  governance. Some 
examples  are MERCOSUR, the largest Latin American trade bloc, CARICOM  
(Carribean Community) and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) trade 
bloc    Other such regional groupings, the Association of South East Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN), the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) have also developed new forms of organization with interesting innovations. The 
Chiang Mai initiative of the ASEAN,  for example,  has sought to develop a foreign 
currency reserve pool which will help countries tide over balance of payments crisis. The 
arena of global governance in which these groups are promoting the greatest debate is the 
reform of the global financial architecture. It is to this topic that we now turn. 
3:  The Global Financial Crisis:  A  Study  in the Inadequacies of Current Global 
Governance. 
3.1 The Impact of the Crisis on Human Development 
Past economic crises have had a disproportionate impact on the living standards of the 
world’s poor. Those who are least able to bear these costs will suffer its consequences 
long after the crisis is over. Infants who suffer from malnutrition will be stunted for life. 
Children who drop out of school are not likely to return and will never live up to their 
potential. Future growth and employment prospects may be impaired if small firms are 
forced into bankruptcy. Economic policies must be particularly sensitive to these 
hysteresis effects.  
The Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General 
Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System:  pp 12 
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It is useful at the outset to review the highly detrimental impact of the global financial 
crisis on the poorest developing countries and in particular with regard to the process of 
human development.  As a direct result of the crisis,  there  were  sharp declines in 
international economic activity, particularly in  trade volumes and capital inflows in 
developing economies. The World Trade Organization estimated that trade would decline 
by 9% in 2009, the largest such decline in nearly sixty years (WTO 2009). Similarly, 
following several years of large capital inflows, financial inflow into developing 
countries are estimated to decline by over 50% to $165 billion in 2009. The consequences 
of these reverses have been calamitous for the purposes of economic security and human 
development. The UN estimates that up to 103 million more people will fall into poverty 
or fail to escape poverty because of the crisis. Much of the most severe consequences will 
be felt in regions which have little capacity for self-insuring against the crisis, such as 
countries in Sub Saharan Africa. The IMF estimated that the cost to African economies 
from the crisis was around $250 billion, coming from the decline in commodity prices 
and the fall in export income. At the same time, the sharp decline in capital inflows and 
remittances has reduced economic activity even further. The ILO estimated in 2008 that 
unemployment in 2009 could increase by some 30 million and reach almost 60 million. 
As incomes and employment are hit, it is the poorest who are least likely to be in a 
position to  survive. Those with the least transferable skills are the first to lose their 
employment and the last to gain it back. In developing economies, further, there is the 
possibility that informalization has increased, further lowering wage rates. These 
coextensive factors serve to reduce income and consumption levels and cause irreversible 
shocks to investment in household capabilities. Thus, children are withdrawn from school 
in order to bolster temporary incomes, although this will mean a perpetuation of long-
term poverty. At the same time, children are also at the danger of greater malnutrition and 
mortality. One study (Friedman and Schady (2009) estimates that the financial crisis has 
increased infant deaths by between 30,000 and 50,000. It is not without reason therefore 
that many policymakers have asserted that the crisis may make the task of achieving 
agreed upon developmental goals very difficult. A particularly forthright statement to this 
effect was made in the 2009 conference by the Prime Minister of Belize,  Dean O. 
Barrow, who noted that (as a result of the crisis) “it goes without saying that there is no   18 
prospect of countries achieving the time-bound Millennium Development Goals” 
(Barrow 2009)
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3.2 Governance Reform in the Global Financial Architecture: Addressing the Imperative 
of Democratic Accountability  
. The design of the global economic and monetary system has clearly 
failed to provide financial stability and thus to establish the necessary conditions for 
promoting human development. These failures have generated  numerous new policy 
prescriptions to redress these shortcomings and to reform global economic governance. 
These are now reviewed, dividing these policies into those designed to address the 
shortfall in democratic accountability and those seeking to  promote  institutional 
experimentation. There is by now an enormous set of proposals that seek to fill these 
gaps. For purposes of brevity, however, the major focus here will be on the proposals of 
the Commission of Experts (2009). In addition, this is appropriate since this was the body 
whose deliberations dealt most comprehensively with these issues. 
This  disruption  in  economic lives  continues  to  plague  virtually every country in the 
world. In many instances countries that have had very little to do with causing the crisis 
in the first place have been among the worst affected by it. The global financial crisis has 
increased the urgency of reforming the global monetary and economic system so as to 
enhance fairer and more effective international economic governance. The last upheaval 
of similar magnitude saw the establishment of the postwar compact to manage the global 
economy, particularly through the establishment of the Bretton Woods Institutions. The 
current crisis however has occurred in an era in which the economic and political power 
of the world is very different. Developing countries have a much greater economic 
weight and assertiveness than before. As a result, it is smaller developing countries in 
particular that have been critical of the ad-hoc arrangements for global governance such 
as the G-20. While it is certainly the case that some countries from the Global South have 
increased their participation and power in global decision making, the legitimacy of  such  
intermediary bodies as appropriate fora for the deliberation of macroeconomic policy and 
                                                 
12 While perhaps hyperbolic, the statement is not without some supporting evidence. For 
example Dodd and Cassels (2006) and  Mozynski (2005) show that the health targets will 
not be met at current rates of progress.    19 
global coordination have been called into question. As the June high-level conference, it 
became extremely clear that most developing countries were strong proponents to reform 
the international financial institutions in order to increase their voice and representation. 
This demand- that of democratic accountability--has led many to support the role of what 
is sometimes termed the “G-192” (or the entire body of the United Nations) in handling 
global economic governance. 
There are of course plural demands being made in the design of the international financial 
architecture, and the interests of developing country governments are by no means 
uniform. Nevertheless, certain commonalities among broad groupings are evident. Table 
2, drawn from Griffith-Jones (2003) depicts the general attitudes of developing versus 
developed countries and financial markets towards  certain  proposals. What is very 
evident from the table is that there are strong conflicts in the desires of various groupings.  
Given the poor representation in international financial decision making of developing 
countries particularly in the IMF, World Bank, and Bank for International Settlements, it 
is not surprising that the proposals most strongly supported by the industrialized countries 
have been accepted while those most desired by the developing countries have at best 
been unevenly endorsed or at worst not acted upon at all. While some more powerful 
countries in the south are  able to circumvent certain prescriptions (for example full 
capital account liberalization), most others are not. 
The demand for greater accountability of the International Financial Institutions to 
developing country interests is not new, and several suggestions have been made in this 
case.  Many of these were reiterated and expanded upon by the commission of experts 
(Commission of Experts 2009). Since each IFI has somewhat different governance 
structures, the proposed reforms are different for each. Nevertheless the main issue for 
both IMF and WB is the quota revision process in which the demands for inclusion of the 
poorer developing nations will need to be met. At the G-20 meeting, BRIC countries 
proposed a quota shift of 7 percent in the IMF and 6 percent in the World Bank Group so 
as to achieve this outcome. While the proposals discussed below will be adopted to a 
greater or lesser degree, any reform in these directions will help to mitigate the 
accountability deficit that is now felt.   20 
 The Report of the Committee of Eminent Persons on IMF Governance Reform, chaired 
by Trevor Manuel, contains some important recommendations with respect to reforming 
voice in the IMF. These include a) Making the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee a Council of Ministers and Governors  with rotational representation, b) 
Revising the quota allotments by April of 2010 to allow greater weighting to developing 
countries as per economic weight and c) promoting a merit-based selection process for 
the managing directors. It should be recognized that changing voting shares will reflect 
the interest of the BRIC countries more effectively, but that alone would not sufficiently 
increase representation of the Least Developed Countries.  In addition to such changes, 
therefore, the Report of the Commission of Experts suggests an application of double 
majority voting
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Recommendations for the reform of the World Bank also have taken the form of 
requiring greater representation. There is already a process in place to do so, including 
the doubling of basic votes and a third African seat on the Board that will work  to 
increase the influence of developing countries. In addition, the Commission of Experts 
suggests that the Bank should undertake a quota revision and should play an increasing 
role in the area of global and regional public goods or aid for trade, to better reflect its 
mandate. 
 to a broader set of decisions so as to compensate for voting imbalances 
at the IMF  (Commission of Experts 2009).  This has been also suggested by others 
(Birsdall 2008, Woods, 2008). 
Another key institution in which accountability will need to be enhanced is the Financial 
Stability Forum (now the Financial Stability Board (FSB)).  The body stands to be the 
most important financial regulator at the international level, but is membership is 
narrowly and arbitrarily construed— consisting now of the original 7 countries, the rest 
of the G20, Spain and the European Commission. For the FSB to retain legitimacy, it will 
need to become more representative and accountable to developing countries as a whole, 
since most developing countries are not represented therein. 
                                                 
13  Double-majority voting requires that decisions be endorsed by both a majority of 
member countries and a majority according to countries' voting weight.   21 
In addition to reform of these bodies, there is a call for reform in the UN development 
system as well.  In the June 2009 conference, there was a call both from the delegates of 
the LDCs in particular as well as the commission of experts for expanding the role of the 
UN in coordinating global economic governance. This stronger role, it was argued could 
be achieved be enhancing the ambit of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).  To 
date, the  international economic governance has been based on the principle of 
specialization and coordination. This said, the multiple mandates of various international 
institutions and specialization within each body weaken the coherence of development 
plans. In order to make development concerns more representative and coherent, the 
commission of experts suggested an overarching inclusive body which integrates these 
mandates.  The establishment of a Global Economic Coordination Council (GECC) as a 
free standing body in the UN for this purpose was proposed. Such a body could act very 
much like the successful Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and, in consultation 
with researchers and political bodies,  could work out normative standards for  policy 
decisions. It could then serve as an  advisory  body to the UN system and other 
international organizations which implement policies and standards. Finally, there was a 
call for the creation of an Intergovernmental Panel of experts to assess systemic risks in 
the global economy
14
3.3 Governance Reform in the Global Financial Architecture: Addressing the Imperative 
of Institutional Experimentation 
. These last two proposals were vetoed by the advanced economies 
before the resolution at the conference. Reform of the UN system will therefore be 
limited to the proposals adopted in the Doha declaration of 2008. 
The governance of the global financial architecture has been weak because of both errors 
of commission (particularly in the policy advice provided by the IFIs and the weakness of 
their response) and omission (not providing a robust global reserve system, having an 
                                                 
14  One of the functions of such a panel would be to oversee the collection of and 
dissemination of relevant global statistics. The usefulness of such a body is evidenced by 
the recent Greek experience in which the extent of budget deficits of the country was 
hidden.   22 
underdeveloped debt workout mechanism and so on). Some of these were extensively 
discussed by the Commission of Experts (2009) and the deliberations are outlined here. 
a) Errors of Commission: Weaknesses in Policy Advice 
As part of its deliberations on the global financial crisis, the United Nations Commission 
of Experts on Financial reform examined the role of national and global monetary 
authorities in the lead up to the crisis and the aftermath. Certain elements of this 
discussion bear noting.   The policy advice offered by the IFIs,  it was argued,  was 
unimaginative and restrictive. Several countries could have limited the fallout to their 
economies if they were not sold on the presumption  of the efficacy of capital and 
financial market liberalization. Instead, the commission suggested, IFIs should now allow 
for a more pragmatic approach to financial flows and actively advise governments on 
capital account management. As part of this effort, there needs to be better and more 
balanced surveillance mechanisms: better, because current surveillance has been shown 
to be inadequate in the failure to predict the global crisis; more balanced in order to 
reflect more widely valued social goals other than the simple maintenance of financial 
stability or low inflation.  The report was critical in general of the narrowness of the 
focus displayed by the monetary authorities of several countries. These authorities 
maintained a sharp focus on low and stable inflation which was believed to be necessary 
for economic prosperity but was treated as being an almost sufficient condition for it. In 
this regard, central banks often ignored other factors, notably maintaining asset price 
stability. While many countries were successful in maintaining low goods price inflation 
(what has been termed the great moderation), at the same time as they were achieving 
success on this front, there was substantial inflation in asset prices (which, unlike price 
inflation in consumer goods is less easy to measure). Countries which sought to intervene 
in the market for international capital inflows (through which asset prices were inflated, 
or on the exchange rate front) were more successful at mitigating the effects of the 
financial crisis on their economies. 
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Central banks which adopted a strict consumer price  inflation targeting regime were 
disadvantaged because they did not have the flexibility to respond effectively to the rapid 
growth in financial asset prices. This was made worse when inflation spread from 
financial assets to other asset classes such as oil, food and other commodities as these 
assets became the focus of intense speculative activity. When this occurred, asset price 
inflation and goods inflation became intertwined and the appropriate policy response 
became unclear. Even so, countries which used the implicit flexibility associated with an 
inflation targeting regime were more effective in their responses to these conjoint 
problems.  
This experience suggests that an uncritical acceptance of an inflation targeting regime 
requires reconsideration. This is especially so with regard to two lessons that can be 
drawn. First, monetary policymakers need to be cognizant of the source of inflation that 
threatens their economies. Inflation arising from rising prices of tradeables in an open 
economy or from state administered prices is unlikely to be effectively countered by 
hawkish interest rate policy. Such a stance will certainly damage the other sectors of the 
economy, without clarity as to whether price inflation will be effectively reduced. For 
those countries in which price inflation is driven by such factors, this lesson is all the 
more important. A second lesson to draw is that monetary authorities need to be 
cognizant of the appropriateness of the target for managing inflation. Focusing on “core” 
inflation and excluding energy and food (as some countries have done) risks ignoring the 
prices which are often most relevant for household welfare.  
If central banks are to respond effectively to future crises, it is clear that the current 
understanding of macroeconomic stability needs to be broadened to include asset price 
stability and real sector stability as well as goods price stability. These have as much of 
an impact on sustaining growth and enhancing employment and welfare as maintaining 
low consumer price inflation and therefore require equal attention.  
b) Errors of Omission: Innovations in the Global Financial Architecture   24 
The final set of concerns tackled by the commission was to think of solutions to longer 
term problems facing the management of global finance. Three topics in particular were 
most extensively discussed. The first had to do with the pathologies of the global reserve 
system. The second issue was the issue of sovereign defaults and their management and 
the third was to imagine new ways in which international borrowing and lending could be 
made more stable. 
The global reserve system and the Triffin Dilemma were central to the crisis and will be 
central to the prevention of future crises. The Triffin Dilemma named after Robert Triffin 
who first described it is the problem that arises when a national currency such as the US 
dollar becomes the international  reserve currency.  Under  flexible exchange  rates, the 
Triffin Dilemma is that the current account imbalances of the reserve country (the US) 
creates volatility  in the dollar exchange rate and therefore  volatility in the value of 
foreign exchange reserves held by other countries. This problem has been made worse in 
the current crisis by the amassing of large amounts of US dollar reserves as insurance 
against crisis by developing countries. This in turn was necessitated by the instability of 
global finance and the  unwillingness of developing countries to be  placed under 
countercyclical conditionalities  from the IMF. Such a system is deflationary (since 
countries maintain excess reserves to mitigate crises) as well as inequitable, since poorer 
countries transfer resources to the richest for very small returns. The commission 
supported the creation of a supranational currency that is not intrinsically linked to the 
external position of any single national economy. Given this, one could imagine a body in 
charge of the reserve currency which would increase the supply of the currency in line 
with the growth in demand for global reserves. This can be achieved through several 
mechanisms including proposals to scale up the IMFs Special Drawing Rights to become 
the  global currency, to promote worldwide  swaps to a new currency (international 
currency certificates) and to build on existing agreements such as swap arrangements 
between regional partners to create a global currency. 
A second long term innovation proposed by the commission is the development of a 
mechanism whereby debt can be rescheduled and made more manageable for sovereign 
nations. At the moment, when nations are unable to meet their financial obligations, there   25 
is a haphazard system to manage the crisis. The typical debt workout mechanism operates 
under the purview of the IMF and other institutions such as the Paris Club. In such 
negotiations, unrealistic expectations of future growth are provided, which only serve to 
put the debtor back in arrears down the line. This leads to very little significant debt relief 
and rather a rescheduling of the obligations. Many developing countries have felt that the 
terms and manner in which their debt obligations were negotiated has been both 
inefficient and iniquitous. The commission therefore called for a well thought out single 
framework for debt relief in which creditors and debtors together restructure debt, based 
on the country’s economic situation. This could be best achieved by the establishment of 
an international insolvency court with common guiding principles. Such a dedicated body 
for this process, which is built on well accepted principles of human-centered 
development, may serve to improve the resolution of crises and mitigate their frequency. 
Such a court would implement agreed upon international principles on the priority of 
claims, including differentiating between distinct debt categories such as private, 
government-guaranteed,  and government-acquired private debt, as well as ‘odious’ debt. 
In doing so, it could process claims and issue losses and write downs in ways that were 
more equitable to the citizens of the debtor and creditor countries. National courts would 
of course, have to recognize the legitimacy of such agreements.  
Finally, there is a need to think of new ways in which developing countries can fund their 
growth. Volatile and pro- cyclical international capital flows have made the need for such 
innovations more urgent. Some new ideas such as GDP bonds and commodity linked 
bonds (for which returns depend on the performance of the economy as a whole or the 
prices of commodities) were proposed by the commission. These have countercyclical 
qualities built in and would be an important addition to the set of financing options 
available to developing countries.  This would make returns on bonds directly linked to 
the performance of the country or commodity so that risk is equitably distributed. 
Similarly, promoting local currency bond markets can enhance financial development by 
reducing currency mismatches which weaken debt structures in developing countries. 
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These and other institutional innovations certainly fall under the category of 
developmental innovation  and obey the imperative of institutional experimentation. 
However, it should be recognized that the ideas present in the report will have to face 
entrenched political  interests and institutional  friction. Whatever the outcome of the 
confrontation between these ideas and the difficulties of their implementation, it appears 
clear that at least some form of these innovations can serve to enhance global stability 
and human development.  
4. Conclusion 
The instrumental roles of political freedoms and civil rights can be very substantial, but 
the connection between economic needs and political freedoms have a constructive 
aspect as well. The exercise of basic political rights makes is more likely not only that 
there would be a policy response to economic needs, but also that the conceptualization-
including comprehension- of “economic needs: itself may require the exercise of such 
rights. It can indeed be argued that a proper understanding of what economic needs are-
their content and their force- requires discussion and exchange. Political and civil rights, 
especially those related to the guaranteeing of open discussion, debate, criticism and 
dissent are central to the processes of generating informed and reflected choices. 
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom pp 153 (Sen 1999) 
“What we should chiefly desire is to find ways to empower ourselves, individually and 
collectively, that also connect us, and ways to connect us that also empower us...  The 
chief instrument for the development and the execution of this program, understood as a 
direction rather than as a blueprint, is the quickened practice of institutional 
experimentalism: motivated, directed, and cumulative experimentation with the 
institutional forms that now define representative democracy, market economy, and free 
civil society.”  
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Roberto Unger, 2002.  “How a progressive alternative to European social democracy may 
require and enable us to change how we think and live.” pp 1   
The global financial crisis and the failings of global governance which were laid bare by 
it have re-energized debates on the importance of global arrangements for human 
welfare. This paper has sought to do two things: first, to provide a simple categorization 
of ways in which global governance is lacking and second, to describe some of the major 
challenges of global governance for human development. Using the climate crisis, the 
health crisis and --more expansively--the global financial crisis as examples, two 
important gaps in global governance were identified and expanded upon: the gap in 
democratic accountability and the gap in institutional experimentation.  
As Sen points out, democratic decision making and deliberation about social choices is 
central to the process of development. When the concerns of social choices have a global 
span, therefore, it is imperative that “public deliberation” include all those directly 
affected by these decisions. If one accepts this viewpoint, then reform of the global 
governance system is urgent. Extant global institutions fail for several reasons to 
adequately represent developing country voices, fail therefore to pay attention to the 
poorest (and those must vulnerable to the consequences of decisions) and fail therefore to 
leverage the perspectives and strengths of public, private and civil society organizations.   
Apart from these issues, effective management of global problems is also hampered by a 
lack of ability to imagine  different forms of governance. The reflexive tendency to 
problems of a global scale is to imagine a solution brokered by nation states, and the 
greatest energy is usually spent on building such institutions. Yet, for many global issues, 
newer forms of institutional organization are being discovered. Thus, for example, in the 
case of  public health, private philanthropy, public private partnerships and global 
agreements are all performing useful roles in improving global health. Similarly, in the 
case of global financial insurance, one sees the burgeoning of regional institutions and 
initiatives. These and other experiments can, as Unger argues, connect and empower 
people to find new, valuable ways to improve development outcomes that may be 
superior to solutions provided by existing models. For the purposes of policy makers, the   28 
challenge is therefore to move away from assuming best practices and to allow for a 
plurality of organizational forms to address pressing global needs.  
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